Security

Auth Model and Trust Boundaries

SF never manages Anthropic OAuth directly. The safe paths are:

API key — user sets ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or configures it in auth.json. SF reads it; never generates or exchanges it.
Cloud providers — Bedrock, Vertex, Azure via their own credential chains.
Explicit local runtime adapters — only when intentionally configured, SF may delegate to a local provider/runtime adapter. SF does not mint, replay, or reuse subscription credentials.

Prohibited patterns:

SF-managed Anthropic OAuth flow for subscription accounts
Reusing user Claude subscription credentials inside SF's own API client
Making a provider believe requests come from a different first-party client than the one actually making them

Write Gate

src/resources/extensions/sf/bootstrap/write-gate.ts enforces a phase-aware write boundary:

During queue mode (pre-dispatch planning): only .sf/ writes and read-only tool calls are permitted. All other file writes are blocked.
QUEUE_SAFE_TOOLS allowlist: read, grep, find, ls, ask_user_questions, planning tools, web research tools.
BASH_READ_ONLY_RE: regex allowlist of commands safe to run during write-restricted phases (cat, git log, npm run test|lint|typecheck, jq, etc.).
Write-gate violations are logged and surfaced to the user; they do not crash the session.

Protected Files

The following files require human review before any automated modification (per docs/SPEC_FIRST_TDD.md):

ADR-*.md — architecture decision records
SPEC.md, ARCHITECTURE.md, AGENTS.md
docs/SECURITY.md, docs/RELIABILITY.md

SF will not autonomously overwrite these. Any proposed change to a protected file is surfaced as a diff for human acceptance.

Secret Scanning

Pre-commit hook via npm run secret-scan:install-hook. Blocks commits containing patterns matching API keys, tokens, and credentials. Install with:

npm run secret-scan:install-hook

Dependency Risk

npm audit runs in CI on every push.
No --ignore-scripts bypass: postinstall scripts are reviewed before adding new dependencies.
Rust N-API bindings (packages/native/) undergo separate native-build review for ABI safety.

Sandbox Model

SF agents execute inside the Pi RPC child process. The write gate and tool allowlist are the primary sandbox. There is no OS-level sandbox (no container or seccomp) in the default local deployment.

Headless unsupervised mode (--no-supervised): SF exits with code 10 (blocked) rather than auto-responding to any interactive tool call. This is the safe default for CI pipelines where no human is available to respond.

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